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SHOULD LIS PENDENS PREVENT THE PERFORMANCE
OF AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT?
ELLA GRAUBARTO
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,' common stockholders of a corporation filed a suit challenging the validity of a contract made by
the corporation five years before, to liquidate its preferred stock.
The corporation was confronted with this dilemma: Should it perform the
contract and liquidate the preferred stock on the day specified for performance in
the contract, or delay all action until the determination by the court of the suit
brought by the common stockholders?
The corporation seized the second horn of the dilemma and notified the holders of preferred stock that the contract would not be performed because of the
Iis pendens.
The assets which comprised the fund for distribution to preferred stockholders consisted of 108,000 shares of United States Steel common stock whose value
on the day the contract should have been performed was about $12,000,000.00.
As a result of the failure to perform because of lis pendens and a sharp drop in
the market value of Steel common, the assets dwindled to $4,000,000.00. This
amount was not enough to liquidate the preferred stock in full in accordance with
the terms of the contract.
Obviously, the time for performance was of greatest importance, and a decision upholding the contract two years afterward, when the assets had shrunk to
one-third of their former value, resulted in irreparable injury to the holders of
preferred stock, who had relied or made commitments upon the faith of the contract.
The Supreme Court in its able opinion upholding the validity of the contract decidcd that, upon the institution of the common stockholders' suits to test
*A.B. Hunter College, New York City, 1917; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh Law School,
1927; admitted to practice, 1927; member of firm of Patterson, Crawford, Arensberg & Dunn,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

lPeoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh United Corporation, 330 Pa. 457, 199 At.
(1938).
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the legality of the contract, the corporation became a stakeholder and "it was not
at liberty to make a distribution of its assets without acting at its peril." That
question, however, was for all practical purposes academic, because the assets of
the corporation had so depreciated in value that there were no funds available for
the payment of damages, had the Court held otherwise.
But the question has a persistence of its own apart from this litigation. Should
a suit by a third party seeking an injunction to prevent the performance of a
contract excuse the party sued from performing the contract in accordance with
its terms, and is there no redress for the loss occasioned by non-performance?
To answer this question it is necessary to determine whether the theory of
lis pendenT should control, or whether the obligation of contract is a more compelling concept. We must balance the need of society to uphold and make effective the judicial decrees of its courts against the right of the individual to rely upon
performance by the other party of his contractual obligations.
The refusal by the corporation in the case cited to carry out its contract because of the lis
pendens resulted in a loss of $8,000,000.00. So calamitous a loss
requires a reexamination of the doctrine of lis
pendens in an attempt to distinguish
those situations where its application is desirable and those where its application
is detrimental to the best interests of society.
I.

Lis PENDENS

Much has been written about the doctrine of lis pendens. It has been said
that it is bottomed on public policy and again on notice. It is, simply and realistically, a rule to protect and dignify the decisions of courts. It is in many cases a
necessary and effective rule.
Where litigation is pending before a court involving specific real or personal
property, it would be dishonest for litigants and humiliating for the court if the
law permitted one of the litigants to make a sale of the property to a third person
while the case was pending, and perhaps frustrate the decree of the court.
The developm'ent of the rule of lispendens may be traced in any of the accepted law books.2
It is sufficient for the purposes of this article to point out that the rule was
familiar both to the common law and to equity practice. It was defined by the
common law in the maxim, "pendente lite, nihil innoventur." As early as 1618
we find the rule mentioned in Sir Francis Bacon's "Ordinances in Chancery." s
The first English cases are concerned with attempts by a defendant in a suit
21 STORY, EQUITY JURIS. (14th ed.) § 536, et seq.. 38 C. J. 4, et seq.
32 MONTAGUE, LORD BACON'S WORKS, 479, 480: "No decree bindeth any one that cometh in
bona fide, by conveyance from the defendant before the bill exhibited; and is made no party either
by bill or by order. But where he comes in pendente lite, and while the suit is in full prosecution,
and without any color of allowance, or privity of the court, there regularly the decree bindeth. But
if there were any intermission of suit, or the court were made acquainted with the conveyance, the
court is to give order upon the special matter according to justice."
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involving title to real estate to convey the property before the court had determined
whether the title was in the plaintiff or in the defendant. This of course was a
shabby trid. With few exceptions 4 the courts very properly denied the purchasers
of such real estate any rights therein pending the litigation.5
The first authoritative analysis of the doctrine in this country will be found
in Chancellor Kent's opinion in Murray v. Ballou.6 In that case, upon a bill
charging a breach of trust, an injunction was issued in 1809 restraining Winter,
a trustee, from selling any of the trust 'estate. The injunction was published in
the Utica Gazette in the county where the lands were situated. In 1810, a year
after the injunction issued, Winter, who had actually been superseded in the trust,
sold the premises to Ballou.
The court charged Ballou with constructive notice of the litigation and ordered
him to reconvey the property.
Murray v. Ballou was followed by a number of similar cases 7 concerning
sales of real estate during the pendency of litigation in which the rule that the
purchaser took with notice of the pending suit was reaffirmed. 8 The same rule
was applied to mortgages assigned during the pendency of litigation. 9
Today in America there are lis pendens statutes in practically all of the states
requiring the recording of suits involving title to real estate. In this way purchasers, upon a search of the title, obtain notice of any pending litigation and are
bound by the court's ultimate decision. 10 The filing of the notice is mandatory,
and failure to do so relieves a subsequent purchaser of notice." This simplifies
and limits the rule.
When the question of the application of the rule to personalty involved in
litigation arose in England, the courts refused to extend the doctrine of lis pendens
to such personal property.
In 189-4 in Wigrarn v. Buckley, 12 where an assignment of book debts was
involved and it was urged that the doctrine of fis pendens bound an assignee,
Lindley (L. J.) said:
4

Worsley v. Earl of Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392 (1746).
Sorrel v. Carpenter, 2 P. Wins. 482 (1728); Walker v. Smalwood, Amb. 676 (1768);
Bellamy v. Sabine, 1 deG. and J. 566 (1857).
61 Johns. Ch. 566 (N. Y. 1815).
7Jackson v. Andrews, 7 Wendd. 152 (N. Y. 1831); Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441
(N. Y. 1817).
8Fessler's Appeal, 75 Pa. 483 (1874) ; Duff v. McDonough, 155 Pa. 10, 25 At. 608 (1893)
(where bond and mortgage were in litigation and bond was sold during suit) ; Green v. Rick, 121
Pa. 130, 15 At. 497 (1888); Hillside Coal & Iron Co. v. Heermans, 191 Pa. 116, 43 Atl. 76
(1899); Union Trust Company of N. Y. v. Southern Navigation Co., 130 U. S. 565 (1889);
Mellen
v. Moline Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352 (1889).
9
City of LaPorte, Ind. v. Northern Trust Co., 187 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 7th, 1911); Note (1921)
10 A. L. R. 306; STORY, EQunTY JURIS. (13th ed.) § 406.
10Anderson v. Pettigrew Foundry Co., 297 Il1. App. 14, 17 N. E. (2d) 60 (1938).
llPitt et al. v. Rodgers, 104 Fed. 387 (C. C. A. 9th, 1900): Corwin v. Bensley, 43 Cal. 253
(1872); Haughwout and Pomeroy v. Murphy, 22 N. J. Eq. 531 (1871); Jorgenson v. Minneapolis
& St. Louis Ry. Co., 25 Minn. 206 (1878).
123 Ch. Div. 483 (1894).
5
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"Such a doctrine would paralyze the trade of the country
Davey (L. J.) said:
Could the multifarious business of life be carried on on such
terms?"
These fears, which canalized the English rule within the domain of real property, did not deter judges in America. The doctrine of lis pendens has often been
applied to personalty in this country. The pressure of commerce and banking has,
however, caused the courts to withdraw from the ambit of the rule negotiable
way."8 But the courts
paper and articles of ordinary commerce sold in the usual
14
have continued to apply lis pendens to other personalty.
It has been generally held that the lis pendens commences with the service of
the subpoena or summons."
Whether or not an injunction issues, the compulsion of the lis pendens is
16
acknowledged.
We have then in this country lis pendens statutes which control the transfer
of real property involved in a pending law suit. We have also a well-developed
doctrine that personal property which is the subject matter of a pending suit may
not be validly transferred during the litigation.
This is all very well where there is no 'executory contract entered into prior
to the institution of the lis pendens and requiring the transfer of the property
while the litigation is still unresolved. But if a contract was entered into in good
faith ante litem motam for the transfer of personal or real property, what then?
When is performance of a contract 'excused and when is a loss on account
of a breach damnum absque injuria? An examination of the rules excusing performance of contracts is necessary in order to see the extent to which courts have
permitted parties to disregard their contractual obligations.
13County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96 (1877); Kieffer v. Ehler, 18 Pa. 388 (1851);

Day v. Zimmerman, 68 Pa. 72 (1871) ; Melnick Bank & Loan Association v. Melnick et al., 318
Pa. 120, 178 At. 144 (1935); Presidio County v. Noll-Young, 212 U. S. 585 (1879); Town of
Thompson v. Orlando Perrine, 103 U. S. 806 (1881) ; Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680
(1887); County of Scotland v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107 (1889); Tregea v. Board of Directors, etc.,
164 U. S. 179 (1895); Orleans v. Platt, 99 U. S. 676 (1879); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Toledo4 & S. H. R. Co., 54 Fed. 759 (C. C. A. 6th, 1888) ; 38 C. J. 16; 17 R. C. L. 1022 el seq.
1 North Carolina Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyer, 191 Fed. 552 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911) ; Diamond
v. Lawrence City, 37 Pa. 353 (1860); Carr v. Lewis Coal Company, 15 Mo. App. 551, R S. W.
907 (1888); McCutcheon v. Miller, 31 Miss, 65 (1856); Lebanon Bank v. Mangan, 28 Pa. 452
(1857); Fessler's Appeal, 75 Pa. 483 (1874); 38 C. J. 15; 17 R. C. L. 1022 el seq. Some courts
have held that lis pendens does not apply to shares of corporate stock: Holbrook v. N. J. Zinc Co.,
57 N. Y. 616 (1874); American Press Ass'n v. Brantingham, 78 N. Y. S. 305 (1902); Central
Savings Bank v. Smith, 43 Colo. 90, 95 Pac. 307 {1908); MacDermot v. Hayes, 175 Cal. 95, 170
Pac. 616 (1917).
IrUnited States v. Cooper, 196 Fed. 584 (D. Mont. 1912); Grant v. Bennett et 4., 96 Ill.
513 (1880); Butler, Trustee v. Tomlinson, 38 Barb. 641 (N. Y. 1862); County of Warren v.
Marcy, 97 U. S. 96 (1877); The Robert Gaskin, 9 Fed. 62 (E. D. Mich. 1881); Wheeler' v.,
Walton & Whann Co., 65 Fed. 720 (C. C. Del. 1895); 38 C. J. 27; 17 R. C. L. 1033.
lANote (1914) 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 871. The rule does not apply to negotiable instruments
even if an injunction issues: Hill v. Scotland County, 34 Fed. 208 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1888) ; School
Dist. No. 11 v. Chapman, 152 Fed. 887 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); 38 C. J. 63; 13 C. J. 647.
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1I.

EXECUTORY CONTRACTS

Under the precepts of the English common law, only an act of God, 17 of the
law,' or the other party1 9 will excuse the performance of a contract.
Wherc an act of God has intervened, making performance impossible, the
moral obligation to perform vanishes in a greater catastrophe. Similarly, the death
or illness of a person required to perform a contract for personal services must
20
neccssarily excuse performance.
Where the act of the adverse party has made performance impossible, there
is no longer a moral obligation on the other party to perform. These reasons for
excusing non-performance are relatively free from questions of morality or expedien-y. a
We come then to the interruption of contractual obligations by the intervention of the law.20b
In the Restatement of Contracts,2o0 it is said that a contractual duty is discharged where performance is prevented or prohibited,
8

"(b) by a judicial, executive or administrative order made with due
authority by a judge or other officer of the United Stares, or 9f any
one of the United States."
This refers to an actual order made in due course by an accredited agency of
the government and not to the mere filing of a suit.
An order of an agency of the government is presumably made after an investigation of facts and a consideration of legal rights, and is, therefore, entitled
to greater weight than the claims of an individual party to a contract. In such
a conflict the order of a governmental agency represents the pressure of society as
a whole against the right of an individual, and the latter must yield.
Similarly, where the legislature in the exercise of its police powers finds certain action necessary for the good of the whole community, private contracts may
7

1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §458.

18Olyphant Boro. School Dist. v. American Surety Co., 322 Pa. 22, 184 At. 178 (1936); 3
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.) § 1939; Monaca Boro. v. M. & A. St. Ry. Co., 247 Pa. 242, 93

At. 344 (1915) ; Webb Granite and Cunst. Co. v. City of Worcester, 187 Mass. 385, 73 N. E. 639
(1905).
191ngle Ex. v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1 (U. S. 1865) ; 13 C. J. 647.
20Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766 (1907); Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305,

47 At!. 286 (1900);

6

WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS

(rev. ed.) § 1940;

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS.

§459; 13 C. J. 642.
20aMonaca Boro. v. M. & A. St. Ry. Co., 247 Pa. 242, 93 At. 344 (1915)

(failure of munici-

palities to give necessary authorization to lay tracks held an excuse) ; Jacobs v. Mingle, 278 Pa.
230, 122 At. 285 (1923) (prohibition amendment did not discharge lessee's liability on a lease
of a hotel).
2ObWhere an injunction is granted against both parties, they are relieved from performance of
a contract: Webb Granite & Const. Co. v. City of Worcester, 187 Mass. 385, 73 N. E. 639 (1905).
20c§ 458 (b).
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have to be set aside because inimical to the general welfare. 21
There are many cases in the law where there has been interference with one
of the parties to a contract, as, for example, in receivership or bankruptcy proceedings.
Although it has been held 22 that the appointment of a receiver excuses the
performance of a contract, the majority and better view is that the appointment
of a receiver does not discharge a contract,2 3 nor does the appointment of a con2
servator. '
25
Bankruptcy is generally considered not to excuse performance of a contract.
Under the Bankruptcy Act a party whose contract has been interfered with by
the bankruptcy may prove a claim for damages for the breach.
An examination of the cases shows a determined effort on the part of the
courts to adhere to the requirement for performance of contracts. Even where an
injunc-;on has been granted by one court against the performance of a contract,
another cou't has held that performance was not excused.
2 1a
For example, in National Carbon Co. v. Bankers Mortgage Company,
a Kansas corporation entered into a lease for some space in a building in Kansas
City, Missouri. After the lease had been entered into the Attorney General
of Kansas instituted a suit in the Kansas state court against the Kansas corporation for an injunction to restrain it from removing its general office to Missouri,
and such an injunction was obtained. When the federal court entertained a suit
for specific performance of tile lease, it held that the injunctive order was not vis
major. This indicates the reluctance with which some courts have approached the
subject of violation of contractual obligations, and indicates that in the absence of
compelling reasons courts should not permit the breach of a contract entered into in
good faith for a valuable consideration.a2

b

Is there any reason why the mere filing of a suit should have the force and
power to postpone and perhaps destroy the rights of contracting parties?

21Zeuger Milk Co. v. School District of Pittsburgh, 334 Pa. 277, 5 A. (2d) 885 (1939);
Monaca Boro. v. M. & A. St. Ry. Co., 247 Pa. 242, 93 Ati. 344 (1915); 13 C. J. 646; Edgar
A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 (1922); State of Indiana v. Brand, 303 U, S. 95
(1938); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 (1935); U. S. C. A.
CONST. Art. I, §10, cl. 1, note 18.
22
Malcomson v. Wappo Mills, 88 Fed. 680 (C. C. S. C. 1898).
28City of Montpelier v. National Surety Co., 97 Vt. 111, 122 At. 484 (1923), 33 A. L. R.
489, 499 (1924) ; Erie Malleable Co. v. Standard Parts Co., 299 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 6ths 1924);
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.) § 1960.
24Com. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 314 Pa. 140, 170 Atd. 686 (1934).
256 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.) § 1980; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium,
240 U. S. 581 (1916); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 433 (1936).
25a77 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
26bSo. Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lumber Co., 179 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 6th,
1910); So. Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lumber Co., 210 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 6th
1914); Doolittle v. Nash, 48 Vt. 441 (1876).
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Lis PENDENS VERSUS EXECUTORY CONTRACTS

We can now consider the juxtaposition of the rules with reference to lis
pendens and those with reference to excusable non-performance of contracts.
The conflict of ideas is well illustrated in the case to which we have referred earlier,
where common stockholders filed suit attacking the validity of a contract between
the corporation and more than 1,000 preferred stockholders. Because the corporation refused td perform its contract the stockholders suffered a loss of about
$8,000,000.00.
In that case the plaintiffs waited five years after the contract was entered
into, and only on the eve of the date set for performance was the suit filed. At
that time brokers, trustees, banks and individuals throughout the United States,
who had relied on the contract for five years and made commitments on the basis
that it would be performed according to its terms, were waiting to have the preferred stock retired.
We have, then, on the ont side a few common stockholders who have no
rights and are merely asserting that a contract is invalid. On the other side we
have more than 1,000 holders of preferred stock who have performed their part of
a bilateral contract and are entitled to have their stock liquidated on a fixed day
in a fixed amount.
Can there be any question that the contractual rights of the preferred stockholders stand higher than the untried claims of the common stockholders? And
yet in applying the doctrine of lis pendens, the court is giving undue consideration
to the plaintiff and is subjugating the contractual rights of other parties to a perhaps frivolous claim.
Mr. Justice Paxton saw the unreasonableness of such a course. In Dovey's
Appeal 8 he considered the effect of a bill in equity on the pledge of stock and said:
"But that bill came to nothing; it was dismissed, and that is the only
decree in the cause. It could not affect this cause unless we hold the
dangerous, if not absurd, doctrine that lis pendens is to apply to every
suit, even where the cause of action is purely imaginary. The consequence of such a rule would be that any man's property could be
tied up, and alienation prevented by the filing of a bill setting forth
a claim which had no foundation whatever."
It is easy to start suits. They may state a serious bona fide legal position, or
on the other hand, they may be frivolous and designed to delay the performance
of a valid agreement.
It ought to be clear that the mere filing of a suit should not interfere with
th-e performance of an executory contract. The protection which the court should
give a litigant attacking the validity of a contract or alleging ownership in property
2697 Pa. 153 (1881).
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should be limited to the granting of an injunction, provided the plaintiff is prepared to filc
a bond to cover all possible damage arising from the breach of the
contract by the Jis pendens.
The advantage of requiring an injunction and a bond is that an injunction
will not be granted if the suit is frivolous, and second, full protection will be
given to all parties who may suffer loss.
If no injunction is obtained and no bond is filed, there is no lis pendens
which operates to prevent performance of an executory contract entered into ante
litem motam.
Unless such a course is pursued we have the amazing result that although no
state can impair the obligation of a contract under the Constitution of the United
States, a private individual by the mere filing of a suit can set at naught the obligation and the liability to perform that contract.
Such a result was never intended. It is due to a failure to define the boundaries within which the rule of lis pendens is operative. The position here taken
is not that it is necessary to adopt a new rule, but only to return to one which has
been forgotten or ignored.
That rule is that the doctrine of lis pendens does not interfere with a contract entered into prior to the filing of the suit.
For example, a mortgage which antedates the commencement of a suit involving real estate may be foreclosed by the mortgagee pending the litigation.
The reason for this is that the rights of the mortgagee arose prior to the lis pendens.
In H. Abraham & Son v. Marie L. Casey,26 - a mortgage was executed August
22, 1883. A suit was filed on March 5, 1884, involving the real estate, and the
mortgage was foreclosed May 25, 1885. The court said:
the lispendens created by that suit did not prevent the exercise by Maxwell of his right to foreclose his mortgage, and therefore
the title which he acquired in the foreclosure proceedings was not
impaired by the pendency of the suit."
27
There are many other decisions.
Similarly, where one enters into a contract for the purchase of land before a
suit is filed challenging its ownership, the lis pendens does not interfere with the
28
carrying out of the contract.

26a179 U. S. 210 (1900).
27
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Long Island L. & T. Co., 172 U. S.
493 (1899); Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277, 105 S. W. 260 (1907); Hopkins v. McLaren, 4 Cow.
667 (N. Y. 1825) ; National Foundry & Pipe Works Ltd. v. Oconto City Water Supply Co., 113
Fed. 793 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902); Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Meridian Waterworks Co., 139
Fed. 661 (C. C. S. D. Miss. 1905); Columbia Ave. Savings Fund, etc. Co. v. City of Dawson, 130
Fed. 152 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1903); Gehlert v. Smiley, 114 S. W. (2d) 1029 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1937).
28
Note (1934) 93 A. L. R. 404; Perszyk v. Milwaukee Elect. R. & L. Co., 215 Wis. 233,
254 N. W. 753 (1934); Parks v. Smoot, 105 Ky. 63, 48 S.W. 146 (1898); Clarkson v. Morgan,
6 B. Mon. 441 (Ky. 1846); Clary v. Marshall, 5 B. Mon. 266 (Ky. 1845); Young v. McClung,
9 Gratt. 336 (Va. 1852) ; Walker v. Goldsmith, 14 Ore. 125, 12 Pac. 537 (1886) ; Abington v.
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Other instances may be found in the reports where the court has protected the
20
rights of parties to a contract and has refused to apply the doctrine of lis pendens.
The principles controlling the conclusions arrived at in these cases should
be applied to all executory contracts made prior to a lis pendens instituted by a
third party.
The next question is, what should be done where the party instituting suit to
challenge a contract obtains an injunction and gives a bond.
If a (is pendens is permitted to halt the performance of a contract, is not the
promisce entitled to damages?
Indeed, he must be if courts are to protect contractual obligations. In
Klauber v. San Diego St. Car Co.,"0 the court said:
"No case has been cited in which it has been held that interference
by a writ sued out by a private litigant will excuse performance of a
contract, although it may deprive the contractor of the means of performance. It is not prevention by operation of law. It is the act
of an individual and not of the government."
In Mascall v. Reitmeier,3 1 damages were allowed where a contract to pay
taxes by labor was unenforceable because the law had changed, permitting payment only in cash. The court said in that case:
"Where no express or implied provision as to the event of impossibility can be found in the terms or circumstances of a contract containing an absolute and unqualified promise, and the contract is no
longer wholly executory, the promisor remains responsible for damages, notwithstanding the supervening impossibility of performance,
and although the happening of the event which renders strict performance impossible was not foreseen by or within the control of
either party."
It is apparent, therefore, that the rule here advanced is neither arbitrary nor
harsh. It protects contract rights and discourages frivolous, fraudulent or collusive suits. It may in some instances deprive an honest litigant of a d;rect weapon
for the recovery of his property. If, however, he acts promptly, he may have a
determination of his rights prior to the time of performance. If the time is too
O'Dell, 197 S. W. 339 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1917); Jennings v. Kiernan, 35 Ore. 349, 56 Pac. 72 (1898);
Lee v. Silva, 197 Cal. 364, 240 Pac. 1015 (1925) ; Austin v. Lauderdale, 83 S. W. 413 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1904) ; Wenstrand v. Albert Pick & Co., 38 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930); Martin v.
Marquardt, 111 S. W. (2d) 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Dodge v. Clark, 268 Fed. 784 (C. C. A.
5th, 1920); see also 17 R. C. L. 1028 citing many cases; Franklin Savings Bank v. Taylor, 131
I1. 376; 23 N. E. 397 (1890).
29Olejniczak v. Indiana Lumber Mfg. Co., 78 Ind. App. 168, 135 N. E. 6 (1922). As to purchasers of property during an appeal without a supersedeas, see cases cited in Notes (1925) 36
A. L. R. 421, (1921) 10 A. L, R. 415.
3095 Cal. 353, 30 Pac. 555 (1892).
31145 Minn. 214, 176 N. W. 486 (1920).
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short, he must obtain an injunction and give a bond to protect the contracting
parties for any losses which may result because of the failure to perform.
Of course, nothing suggested in this article is intended to apply to cases of
contempt, where a litigant deliberately transfers property involved in litigation
2
In such cases the doctrine of li"
in order to frustrate the decree of the court."
pendens is an indispensable safeguard.
But the best interests of business, commerce and private relationships require
that lis pendens should not apply where parties have entered into a bona fide
executory contract unless the plaintiff attacking the validity of the contract is prepared to present his claim to the court, obtain an injunction and give bond in
order to protect the contracting parties from such damages as may accrue from
non-performance.
Only in this way will the court chart an even course between the conflicting
requirements of contractual obligations and lis pendens.
PITTSBURGH, PA.
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32
Merrimack River Savings Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U. S. 527 (1911); Lineker v. Dillon,
275 Fed. 460 (N. D. Cal. 1921); In re Mardenfeld,' 256 Fed. 920 (N. D. N. Y. 1919); Lamb v.
Cramer, 285 U. S. 217 (1932) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.) § 1939.

